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Positive Political Economics of Greek-type Crises 




The Greek bail-out was highly controversial. An oft-heard assessment is that i) the bail-out 
was a mistake, ii) the political haggling over it was irrational and iii) the bail-out will create a 
moral hazard problem. Contrary to this view, our analysis suggests that, given EMU’s present 
political-economic set-up, i) the bail-out was unavoidable, ii) the lengthy process of political 
haggling leading to it was understandable, and iii) the bail-out does not have to be necessarily 
associated with a future moral hazard problem. Based on our analysis, we suggest that the 
EMU’s institutional design could be improved by establishing ‘exit rules’ and that bail-outs 
should be made rule-based. We have based our analysis on a political-economic, game-
theoretic model that helps to understand why and how the parties involved in the Greek crisis 
arrived at the bail-out and on what conditions the final solution depended. The model allows 
tracing analytically the dynamics of the negotiation processes as well as the conditions and 
parameters on which the scope and limits of fiscal redistribution in EMU depends. In doing 
so, we formally take account of the ‘negative externality’ problem that has been central to 
policy debates related to the EMU’s institutional design and has played an important role in 
the Greek crisis. However, contrary to the existing literature, we do not only focus on the 
economic aspects of such negative externality, but also look at where they emanate from and 
interact with political factors, in particular the dynamics of the political negotiation process 
within the EMU. 
JEL-Code: E62, F33, H77, C70. 
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With  the  outbreak  of  the  Greek  sovereign  crisis  in  early  2010,  the  EMU  confronted  the 
biggest challenge in its decade-long history. After months of political haggling, the euro area 
came up with an unprecedented bail-out for Greece worth EUR 110 billion.
1 The support 
package has proved highly controversial among economists who disagree strongly whether 
this has been the right policy course. Some commentators (e.g., Frankel (2010), Issing (2010) 
or Wyplosz (2010)) have strongly argued that providing financial support is a policy mistake, 
as it undermines the foundations of the EMU (i.e. particularly the ‘no bail-out’ clause and the 
prohibition of monetary financing) and thus jeopardizes the euro in the long-run by creating a 
moral hazard problem and hampering the Eurosystem’s credibility. In contrast, others (i.e. 
Eichengreen (2010) or Padoa-Schioppa (2010)) have argued that letting Greece default would 
spread the crises to other members, like Spain or Portugal, creating a risk of the EMU break-
up which would trigger “the  mother of all  financial crises”. Hence,  in their view, Europe 
needs to create a strong emergency financing mechanism, eventually backed by higher degree 
of  political  integration  (e.g.  De  Grauwe  (2010),  see  also  Baldwin  et  al.  (2010)  for  an 
interesting overview of the debate). 
 
While the discussion has been intense, and the controversies abound, it has been so far limited 
only to normative policy-oriented issues, focused mostly on the economic aspects, with much 
less account of the political-economic considerations
2 and has so far not generated formal 
models able to analyze the crisis. In this paper we propose a positive analysis that can serve as 
a framework for describing and analyzing Greek-type sovereign debt crises in the context of 
the EMU in a structured manner. We build on a political economic, game-theoretic model 
with incomplete political integration that, by taking into account the interactions between the 
economic and political factors, helps to understand why and how the parties involved in the 
Greek crisis arrived at the bail-out and on what conditions the final solution depended. We 
demonstrate that, conditional on the present political-economic set-up of EMU, the bail-out 
                                                 
1 The bail-out for Greece took the form of a 3-year package of emergency loans, with EUR 80 billion offered by 
the euro area members and EUR 30 by the IMF. A few days later the EU established a special purpose vehicle, 
namely the so-called European Stabilization Mechanism (ESM), worth EUR 750 billion. The ESM involves a 3-
year stabilization plan that includes EUR 60 billion provided by the European Commission, EUR 440 billion 
provided in bilateral loans and guarantees by euro area members, as well as EUR 250 billion from the IMF. In 
addition, the ECB committed to the direct purchase of government bonds on the open market. 
2 See, for example, Fisher et al. (2007) for a survey of political-economic arguments related to the EMU issues, 
although without accounting for a positive modeling framework.  
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was inevitable, i.e. a threat of default by one member that creates a negativity externality for 
the whole monetary union must (under identifiable conditions) result in sharing the costs of 
fiscal adjustment by the rest of the members. Importantly, we show that such bail-out does not 
need to be associated with a moral hazard problem. 
 
One  of  the  key  novelties  in  our  work  is  that  we  formally  take  account  of  the  negative 
externality problem that has been central to policy debates related to EMU’s  institutional 
design since the very birth of the euro (see, for example, Gros et al. (2005) and de Haan et al. 
(2004) for early contributions within this debate) and played an important role in the specific 
case of the Greek crisis in the form of – as some commentators call it – a “bail-out blackmail” 
(see Mayer (2010)). However, contrary to the existing literature, we do not only focus on the 
economic aspects of such a negative externality, but also look at where it emanates from and 
how it interacts with political factors, in particular the dynamics of the political negotiation 
process within the EMU, i.e. to what extent a ‘troubled’ EMU member may negotiate a bail-
out due to the existence of a negative externality arising from its potential default. 
 
Furthermore,  the  model  also  allows  tracing  analytically  the  dynamics  of  the  negotiations 
process as well as the parameters on which the scope and limits of a fiscal redistribution 
depend. In doing so, the analysis helps to shed some light on several key policy aspects, such 
as: i) the conditions under which a bail-out does not generate a moral hazard problem in the 
long-run, ii) the role of political factors such as voters attitude towards fiscal retrenchment 
and their support for the European integration process, iii) how the risk of contagion to other 
weak members, the perceived risk of EMU break-up or the possibility of coalition-building 
between groups of euro area members can affect the negotiation outcome, iv) the duration of 
the political haggling over the bail-out. 
 
We show that the political negotiations over the bail-out can be described by a brinkmanship 
threat game in which the respective brinkmanship is formalized and completed by a Nash 
bargaining solution. The analysis determines the scope and limits of the brinkmanship and 
subsequently  inquires  into  the  bargaining  solution.  However,  contrary  to  the  existing 
literature, the bargaining problem is characterized by disutility rather than utility allocations. 
A  hallmark  of  the  model  is  that  haggling  over  fiscal  adjustment  costs  is  captured  in  a 
bargaining that renders the entire threat game analytically as well as empirically tractable (see 




The paper is composed of four sections. The next section presents our analysis in the context 
of  the  existing  literature.  The  following  section  presents the  modeling  framework,  i.e.  its 
general  structure,  the  nature  of  brinkmanship,  and  the  subsequent  bargaining.  The  final 
section concludes and discusses some policy implications. 
 
 
2 Related literature 
 
The Greek bail-out involved intense negotiations among euro area members and depended a 
great  deal  on  political  factors.  At  the  onset  of  EMU,  already  Bordo  and  Jonung  (1999) 
highlighted that that political factors will be the central determinants of the future of EMU. In 
such a setting, game theoretic analysis seems highly suitable and instructive.  
 
In fact, there is already a long tradition to use the type of modeling to different aspects of 
international  relations  (see,  for  example,  Dixit  and  Nalebuff  (2008),  Zagare  and  Kilgour 
(2000) for extensive surveys). Within this general line of research there exists also a diverse 
literature  on  applications  of  threat  games  and  brinkmanship  strategies  respectively  (see 
Schwarz and Sonin (2008) for a survey of related strands in literature as well as Acemoglu 
(2003)  on  general  issues,  at  which  research  in  economics  and  political  science  overlap). 
However,  most  of  this  literature  has  been  applied  mainly  to  political  science.  The  few 
exceptions that capture economic applications address international trade negotiations (e.g., 
Milner and Rosendorff (1997)), exchange-rate policies (Fahrholz (2007)) or selected cases of 
economic history (e.g., Yared (2010); Dye and Sicotte (2006)). 
 
Our analysis differs from the above literature as it concerns the political-economic aspects of 
EMU. The political-economics setting of our analysis resembles that of Alesina and Drazen 
(1991)  who  argue  that  domestic  fiscal  reforms  may  have  significant  distributional 
implications, so that societal groups may seek to pass the burden of fiscal adjustment costs 
onto other groups at the national level. However, our focus is on the mutual dependence of 
fiscal policy-making within EMU-member states. We particularly account for the interaction 
between both the national and the European sphere. In this regard, we consider the canonical 
‘Schelling  conjecture’  (Schelling  (1960);  Dixit  (2006)  for  a  reappraisal).  This  ‘two-level 
metaphor’  postulates  that  national  executives  intermediating  between  the  national  and  the  
 
4 
European level have to craft ratification within the domestic arena. The latter process can also 
be traced to a permissive consensus of voters and lobbies that can enforce substantial political 
conflict potential. Such a domestically constrained executive can  make use of  its  internal 
‘weakness’  in  terms  of  enhancing  its  bargaining  position,  for  instance,  in  negotiations 
concerning European fiscal affairs. In case there exists an opportunity of playing off national 
constituency against other entities and inflicting the latter actors with negative externalities 
such proactive stance toward moral-hazard behavior represents a ‘brinkmanship’ strategy. The 
scope and limits of such a ‘threat’ may thus represent bargaining leverage, for example, in 
European fiscal affairs depend on numerous aspects. 
 
There  exists  theoretically  oriented  literature  of  both  disciplines  economics  and  political 
science  which  enquires  into  conditions  determining  corresponding  strategy  sets.  In  this 
respect, according models account not only for actors’ preferences but also for their attitudes 
toward risk and time (discount rates) etc. The latter research approach is usually known as the 
‘Nash-program’  (Binmore  et  al.  (1986))  and  traces  in  the  seminal  contributions  of  Nash 
(1950, 1953). As regards formal modeling, the number of actors involved (Mao (1993)), the 
way of modeling constraints – i.e. the Schelling-conjecture – including the distribution of 
information  concerning  this  matter  (Tarar  (2001);  further,  Iida  (1993)),  and  assumptions 
concerning discount rates shape particular threat games. 
 
 
3 Modeling framework 
 
In this section we outline the modeling framework. Our analysis is based on a brinkmanship 
game, which may be solved by a Nash bargaining solution (Nash (1950, 1953)). The analysis 
determines  the  scope  and  limits  of  the  brinkmanship  and  subsequently  inquires  into  the 
bargaining solution. It demonstrates to what extent a ‘troubled’ EMU member may negotiate 
a bail-out due to the existence of a negative externality arising from its potential default. 
 
The general set-up 
 
In order to keep the game simple and tractable, the focus is limited to several key aspects of 




First, the main basis of the game is the negative externality problem arising from the fact that 
an unsustainable fiscal position and a threat of default by one EMU member is likely to spill-
over  on  the  rest  of  EMU  members.  As  indicated  earlier,  since  the  birth  of  the  euro  the 
negative  externality  problem  has  been  central  to  all  policy  debates  related  to  EMU’s 
institutional design. In fact, it has been one of the key arguments in favor of the Stability and 
Growth Pact: imposing fiscal rules on EMU members would – as it was hoped – counter the 
tendency for fiscal bias and free riding.
3 Also in the context of the recent euro area crisis 
Baldwin, Gros and Laeven (2010) point out that “(…) in a monetary union without a fiscal 
union governments might be tempted to run up unsustainable debts and push the ECB to 
inflate them away or run up high levels of debts that would create negative spillovers for 
others.” Substantial negative externality effects have been also confirmed empirically. For 
example, Faini (2006) has shown that expansionary fiscal policy in one EMU member state 
has an effect not only on the spreads of this particular member’s interest rates, but also – and 
to an even greater extent – on the average level of interest rates in the whole euro area. In 




Such negative externality may take different forms. For example, decreased political support 
for  European  integration  process,  deteriorated  financial  market  access,  protracted  growth 
slack or disrupted trade relations (henceforth we call them ‘externality costs’).
5 Because the 
above costs adversely affect all the  members, such externality  may  serve as a  bargaining 
leverage that a particular member can use for negotiating redistribution – a bail-out – of its 
costs  of  fiscal  adjustment  within  EMU.  While  such  concessions  may  in  principle  take 
pecuniary  form  (for  example,  some  sort  of  fiscal  transfers)  or  non-pecuniary  form  (for 
example,  loosening  some  rules  in  face  of  deteriorating  fiscal  position),  in  the  following 
discussion we focus on the former compensation. 
 
                                                 
3 For the early discussions on the rationales for the Stability and Growth Pact and its provisions see for example, 
Artis and Winkler (1998), Beetsma and Uhlig (1999), Brunila et al. (2001) or Buti and Sapir (2006). 
4 It is worth noting that it did not seem to work this way during the current Greek crisis. In fact, German interest 
rates fell down in reaction to Greek woes, whereas those of Spain, Portugal or Ireland increased.   
5 Note  that  the  negative  externality  arises  here  in  the  political  economics  context.  On  purely  economic 
considerations it can be argued that letting Greece default could be efficient as it would strengthen incentives for 
structural reforms among all EMU countries. In other words the default would lead to some sort of “positive 
externality’. However, reforms that eventually benefit all are often resisted or delayed and a growing body of 




Second, there are two types representative players involved in the game. Within EMU there 
are a group of countries which suffer from the twin problems of public debt sustainability and 
external  debt  sustainability.  These  ‘twin  deficit’  countries  –  think  of  Greece,  Spain  or 
Portugal  –  are  labeled  ‘TD’.  The  second  group  of  countries  –  think  of  Germany  –  is 
characterized by current account surpluses within the euro area and sustainable public debt 
position (henceforth labeled ‘CA’).
6 Later we assume that only one particular TDi – think of 
Greece – faces an imminent default risk, although other TDs are susceptible. This assumption 
allows us to bring the structure of the model closer to the ongoing discussion and to take into 




Third, there is incomplete political integration among the players: Countries have different 
incentives  to  be  EMU  member,  face  different  constituency  constraints  and  there  is  no 
automatic emergency financing mechanism for unwinding severe fiscal and macroeconomic 
imbalances in EMU. In fact, for this reason, a fierce bargaining within European fiscal affairs 
has recently evolved. 
 
Both representative players TD and CA are interested in preserving smooth functioning of 
EMU. From the viewpoint of TD, membership in the euro area is advantageous as it provides 
access to financial markets and to real external resources (as euro loosens external constraints 
for TD). At the same time, membership in the euro area is beneficial for CA, as it supports its 
export-oriented policy stance (due, inter alia, to a slower growth of its relative unit labor 
costs) – a reversal of this policy stance and associated adjustment of production processes 
would incur CA with short run costs. 
 
Against this background there exits a public good ‘EMU stability’, whose deterioration in the 
course  of  one  member’s  default  would  make  all  players  worse  off.  While  the  individual 
                                                 
6 Sustainability of public finances is understood here in relative terms. While such a relative position is key for 
the financial markets in the short and medium-run which is the focus of this analysis, one has to remember that 
due to the ageing problem, all EU member countries face severe challenges for their public finances. According 
to the OECD, with no policy change only because of demographic changes, the average debt rises to 500% of 
GDP in 2060). 
7 The IMF was an important player during negotiations over the bail-out. For simplicity, we do not formally 
include the IMF into the game. However, integrating the IMF into the model would increase the bargaining 
power of TDi (as has been the case with Greece) which would strengthen the case for bail-out. Integrating into 
the model another external actor would also not rule out the issue of negative externality stemming from the 
institutional set-up of EMU.  
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motivation is different, the interest in preserving a smooth operation of EMU is shared by all 
players. Hence, both TD and CA have some willingness-to-pay for preserving EMU stability 
and their membership within EMU. 
 
This  mutual  willingness-to-pay  for  ‘EMU  stability’  is  the  foundation  of  bargaining  for 
redistribution of players’ cost shares within EMU. In this context, an individual TD player 
may  resort  to  a  brinkmanship  strategy,  as  its  potential  default  would  create  a  negative 
‘externality cost’, i.e. a Damocles sword hanging over the rest of EMU members. Within the 
scope and limits of such brinkmanship strategy, CA might be credibly threatened to actually 
reveal its willingness-to-pay for ‘EMU stability’. Accordingly, TD may effectively elicit a 
bail-out by the rest of EMU  members. Importantly,  for all players there  is the risk of an 
overall worst outcome for such maneuvering on the brink – this worst outcome constitutes the 
threat, which is not under full control by the players. As soon as it turns out that the threat is 
indeed  credible  brinkmanship  ensues.  Our  analysis  then  inquires  into  a  Nash  bargaining 
solution (NBS) for that conflict which completes the entire threat game. We show to what 
extent a single TD may indeed pass some of the ‘fiscal adjustment costs’ on to the rest of 
EMU, i.e. successfully incur CA with some of the burden of financial assistance. 
 
The analysis unfolds in three steps: First, we discuss the basic characteristics of such a threat 
game.  Second,  the  brinkmanship  is  elaborated.  Third,  we  determine  a  sub-game  perfect 




A  single  TD i  (denoted  as  player 1  j ,  whereas  1   i n )  and  a  representative  CA 
(player 2  j  in place of the group of current account surplus countries within the euro area) 
are two risk-neutral players with quasi-linear preferences for the public good ‘EMU stability’. 
The first player TD i has complete but imperfect information regarding CA’s willingness-to-
pay  for  preserving  a  smooth  functioning  of  EMU.  As  mentioned  above,  the  reason  for 
distinguishing between particular TDs is that there might be a contagion effect (i.e. a negative 
externality) in the course of a likely bail-out of a single twin deficit country. Furthermore, we 
assign bargaining power to both players:  i   is the bargaining power of a TD i and  i   the 
particular  corresponding  bargaining  power  of  CA,  with  1    i i   .  At  the  heart  of  our  
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brinkmanship game is the haggling between the TD i and CA over sharing the costs of fiscal 
adjustments within EMU, i.e. contributions to safe-guarding ‘EMU stability’. These costs are 
denoted as 
F
i C (henceforth, ‘fiscal adjustment costs’) for the specific TDi. By the same token, 
benefits with respect to a single TD i are denoted as  i B  – these benefits stand for preserving 
membership within EMU and providing access to financial markets and external resources. 
From the perspective of CA, the same  i B  represents the benefits from euro area membership 
as prerequisite for its export-oriented stance.
8 
 
In this regard, another issue concerns the limited liability feature of CA, which is the extent to 
which CA countries within the euro area actually pay for TDs’ failure in fiscal consolidation. 
A deterioration of the public good ‘EMU stability’ entails above all costs for TDi. However, 
CA will also suffer from a default as it has a stake in EMU. Though, CA has a particular 
subsidiary  role:  While  TD i  will  not  accept  costs  higher  than  total 
F
i C  in  exchange  for 
contributing to ‘EMU stability’, CA will administer financial assistance within the limits of 
their maximum willingness to pay if 
D F
i i C C  . Accordingly, CA will have limited liability 
amounting to a share  i   of total 
F
i C  with 0 1   i  . This is to say, CA countries will at most 
transfer funds to TDiamounting to 
F
i C , because beyond that point their willingness to pay for 
preserving  ‘EMU  stability’  would  be  exhausted,  too.  The  following  proposition  can  be 
derived from these considerations: 
0               if 
0 <   < 1 if  2




i i i i i
C C
C C C  
 





Bearing  the  entire 
F
i C  reflects  each  player’s  maximum  willingness  to  pay  for  successful 
managing  Greek-type  crises  within  EMU.  In  this  regard, 
F
i C  reflects  each  player’s  cost 
tolerance in escalation processes of brinkmanship. The rationale of such brinkmanship is that 
TD i threatens to realize the overall worst pay-off represented in the disagreement point d . In 
doing so, it can under identifiable conditions pass a share of the fiscal adjustment costs, 
F
i C , 
                                                 
8 We assume that the benefits are the same for both players as it renders the game simpler to solve. One may 
rightly argue that benefits can be different for, say, a big economy like Germany and, say, a small one like 
Greece. However, assuming that the benefits were not symmetric would not change the general tone of our 
results, so we have decided to keep the game as simple as possible.  
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on the rest of the EMU members. If a credible brinkmanship evolves, then both players will 
not maximize their piece of the pie, but minimize their respective share of fiscal adjustment 
F
i C  during negotiations. The present bargaining problem is thus characterized by the tuple 
(  i C d )  where 
2 
  i C R  is  a  vector  combination  of  feasible  (dis)utility  allocations.  The 
disagreement point d  is the bargaining outcome if both parties’ negotiations break down. In 
that case, markets will notice that both TD i and CA cannot agree on an appropriate policy 
solution  for  TD i  that  helps  safe-guarding  ‘EMU  stability’,  i.e.  redistributing  the  ‘fiscal 
adjustment costs’ amounting to 
F
i C . This will then, in turn, trigger a default. This way the 
realization of d  is equivalent to the occurrence of default costs 
D
i C . The following costs arise 
in this game  ( )
F
i G C d  : First, there are the above mentioned ‘fiscal adjustment costs’ 
F
i C  for 
bail-outs around which the bargaining revolves. If the according negotiations on distributing 
F
i C  were to break down, then a default will occur, and both players will be stuck with the 
disagreement point d  comprising the actual ‘default costs’ 
D
i C  and  i   respectively. 
 
Further reservations regarding the delineated basic characteristics of this brinkmanship game 
are as follows: On the one hand, the question arises whether TDs should form a cartel to 
strengthen their  brinkmanship vis-à-vis other EMU  members. On the other hand, whether 
other  EMU  countries  within  the  euro  area  can  announce  in  advance  that  they  will  club 
together in order to punish the first country which dares to practice brinkmanship. This is to 
say that they might pursue an enter-deterrence game. However, because of the coordination 
problem and competition between all EMU members both scenarios are unlikely. As to the 
first  scenario,  if  it  becomes  evident  that  some  particular  TDs  explicitly  coordinate 
brinkmanship strategy then this may lead financial markets and other members of EMU to 
discriminate more between both group of countries, TDs and CAs. Also, since – as we have 
assumed before – only TD i is facing an imminent default risk, other TDs will not be willing 
to join as it might signal the financial markets that they also face an imminent default risk. As 
to  the  second  scenario,  the  coordination  problem  among  CA  countries  arises  because  of 
uncertainty regarding their future potential need for assistance.
9 
                                                 
9 The scope for an enter-deterrence game is limited also by the fact that due to problems of effective monitoring, 
assessing fiscal policy and identifying deliberate infringement to fiscal rules in EMU is a complicated issue (e.g. 
Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004) discussing it in the context of pro-cyclical fiscal positions and boom-bust phases). 




Successful brinkmanship is especially dependent on the two given probabilities  p  and  i q  that 
are independent of each other and endogenous. The latter say depicts the fact that the cost 
structure determines the probability values. From the perspective of a TDi,  p  denotes the 
probability of encountering an ‘offish’ CA or a ‘lavish’ one with a probability (1 ) p  . The 
more offish the CA, the lower is the probability of executing successful brinkmanship. At this 
stage,  we take  up on the  point that  a  TD i  as  an  EU  member  has  a  say  in  the  European 
decision-making process. Hence, CA may link financial assistance as a tool when seeking a 
TD i’s consent to any agreement. In line with this rationale, we assume that values of  p  are 
smaller than 1. At the same time  0  p  because CA has at least some willingness to pay for 
preserving ‘EMU stability’ (see above). Hence, we reject according corner solutions of  p , so 
that 0 1   p . 
 
The  probability  i q  basically  describes  the  likelihood  of  externalities  by  triggering  voter 
alienation towards enacted fiscal consolidation processes, i.e. incurring the electorate with the 
full  amount  of  ‘fiscal  adjustment  costs’ 
F
i C .
10 Uncertainty  regarding  the  constituency’s 
reaction to stipulated fiscal retrenchment processes may buttress TDi’s bargaining position in 
negotiations vis-à-vis CA. If the electorate was completely ‘Europhile’, then there would be 
no room for the government for incurring other EMU members with any form of externality 
costs  as  imposed  fiscal  austerity  would  not  havoc  any  political  upheaval.  In  fact,  the 
according probability  i q  would be zero in such circumstances. At the same time, we expect 
that voters as well as their delegated governments must also rank the benefits  i B  as valuable. 
Otherwise, any efforts towards fiscal consolidation within TD i would be unacceptable, and a 
government  would  be  unable  to  craft  consensus towards  its  contribution  to  safe-guarding 
‘EMU stability’ in the domestic arena. In line with the aforementioned reasoning, we exclude 
according corner solutions so that 0 1   i q . There accordingly exist some political resources 
on  the  national  level,  which  a  government  in  TD i  may  play  off  against  CA  in 
intergovernmental European negotiations. 
 
                                                 
10 Here, national strikes in Greece provide a vivid example how political imponderability on the national level 
may bring about a bargaining leverage in international negotiations.  
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If the conditions for successful brinkmanship are met, then CA will dance obligingly to TDi’s 
tune and share some ‘fiscal adjustment costs’ 
F
i C  in terms of providing a bail-out. In the 
following  paragraphs,  we  determine  the  Nash  strategies,  i.e.  the  mutually  best  responses 
which will eventually constitute a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the brinkmanship 
game. 
 
The brinkmanship game 
 
We proceed with the analysis of the political-economic, game-theoretic model by simplifying 
things without loss of generality: Given that both players’ maximum willingness to pay for 
‘EMU stability’ in terms of still reaping the benefits  i B  from smooth operation of the euro 
area corresponds to the total 
F
i C , we can normalize  1
F
i i C B   . Hence, we can transform the 
threat  game  ( )  i G C d  to the  form  of  ( )   i d   with 
2 0 1

       ij ij i i c c R   .  The  standard 
assumption holds that  i   is a non-empty, convex and compact set comprising any convex 
combination of  vector  1 2 ( )   ij i i c c c . In this game  ( )   i d   TD i  quasi  maximizes the CA’s 
share of ‘fiscal adjustment costs’ for safe-guarding ‘EMU stability’, i.e. incurring them with 
the costs of their negative externality. The bargaining may lead to a new outcome  i c  for TD i. 
In turn, TD i burdens CA with the share 1 i c . Accordingly, the players’ continuous utility 




( ) (1 ).
i i i i
i i i
u c c c




At the same time, the brinkmanship game  ( )   i d   still comprises the disagreement point d  – 
i.e.  the  realization  of  default  costs 
D
i C  –  and  represents  TD i ’s  threat,  where  the  pay-off 
is( 1 )   i   in line with the aforementioned proposition (see above). 
 
Contagion and moral hazard effects 
 
Two different sub-games of  ( )   i d   due to complete but imperfect information have to be 
taken into consideration. First, TDi does not know whether it will encounter an offish ( ) p  or 
a lavish (1 ) p   CA. In this context, specific default costs have to be considered. On the one  
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hand, a single crisis has the potential to trigger further defaults of all n TD i. This would be 
the overall worst pay-off from the viewpoint of CA. Therefore, fearing such exorbitant costs 
the primary goal of CA would be to sustain the support in each TD i for safe-guarding ‘EMU 
stability’. From this point of view, it may be more beneficial to be lavish. Second, CA may 
display a rather reluctant attitude towards providing bail-outs because any obvious generosity 
would intensify moral hazard behavior which possibly does require transferring n-times of 
i c . Due to CA’s ambiguous attitude towards providing extra funding, the TDi’s pay-offs have 
to be weighted with a probability  p  for encountering an offish and (1 )  p  for a lavish CA. 
 
The TD i’s feasible set of strategies is comprised of two choices: ‘consolidate’ or ‘not-to-
consolidate’.  The  latter  strategy  consists  of  practicing  brinkmanship  on  the  basis  of  the 
premise that national constituency would not accept consolidation measures. If TDi chooses 
to ‘consolidate’, i.e. not practicing brinkmanship, it forgoes the opportunity to pass a share  i c  
of ‘fiscal adjustment costs’ on to CA. This would be the best pay-off from the perspective of 
CA. When TD i relies on a strategy of choosing ‘not-to-consolidate’, the outcome ultimately 
depends on the reaction of CA. The latter player can choose a strategy of ‘bail-out’ or ‘no-
bail-out’ by withholding any funding. The according pay-offs are as follows: If TD i chooses 
a strategy of ‘consolidate’, then it receives zero, whereat CA receives the entire benefits of 
secured ‘EMU stability’, i.e. further smooth operation of euro area, amounting to 1. If TD i 
chooses to ‘not-to-consolidate’, CA can ‘bail-out’ or ‘no-bail-out’. When CA reins TD i ’s 
prospective default in, then TD i receives the aspired alleviation of ‘fiscal adjustment costs’ in 
amount of  i c . In this case CA receives a pay-off (1 )  i c . Taking into account the principle of 
equal  treatment  within  Europe,  however,  CA  may  also  have  to  deal  with  transferring 
payments to all TD i amounting to n times the size of (1 )  i c . If CA chooses to ‘no-bail-out’, 
TD i  may  be stuck with default costs amounting  to ( )  i q . The latter pay-off  hinges upon 
TD i’s likelihood of losing public support for fiscal retrenchment and consequently defaulting. 
Simultaneously, CA receives the pay-off ( 1 )    i i i q q   or 
1 ( 1 )
    
N
i i i i q q   in the case of 




A brinkmanship strategy has to meet some prerequisite conditions. In particular, a successful 
brinkmanship  has  to  be  effective  and  acceptable.  The  effectiveness  condition  of  such 
brinkmanship rests on the extent of TD i’s default: As CA is increasingly affected by costs, a 
TD i’s threat gains more credibility. In this respect, the probability of default is subject to a 
critical  threshold:  If  the  respective  probability  is  too  small,  CA  cannot  be  coerced  into 
providing financial assistance. However, the credibility of the brinkmanship strategy is also 
dependent on whether the outcome is acceptable to TD i. If the probability of a default is too 
high and, hence, the acceptability condition cannot be accomplished, then TDi will have to 
‘consolidate’. In turn, this player will entirely incur the envisioned ‘fiscal adjustment costs’ 
for sustaining ‘EMU stability’. 
 
The TD i’s brinkmanship will be successful, which means eliciting the desired extra funds 
amounting to  i c , if it constitutes a credible threat. In this regard, TD i’s brinkmanship may be 
effective, if the expected pay-off of CA from a choice to ‘bail-out’ is higher than from a 
decision to ‘no-bail-out’ when taking into account possible contagion, i.e. defaults spilling 
over to other TDs. Therefore, 
1
( 1 ) (1 )

      
N
i i i i
i
q q c   













The probability   i min q  is the lower bound of the brinkmanship for TDi. Below this level CA 
would choose a strategy of ‘no-bail-out’, even if it is lavish. However, with a probability of 
p  TD i may feel that the strategy ‘not-to-consolidate’ is too risky with regard to encountering 
an offish CA. At the same time, TD i will encounter a lavish CA with a probability of (1 )  p , 
which will choose a strategy of ‘bail-out’ given that the effectiveness condition holds. Thus, 
for a given 0 1   i q  TD i  will pose a probabilistic threat, if its expected pay-off is higher 
than a zero pay-off from choosing to ‘consolidate’: 
( ) (1 ) 0      i i q p c p  











Accordingly, the acceptability condition depends on values for p . Therefore, values for  p  
have to be below a critical threshold. Otherwise,   i max q  would have to be even smaller than 
 i min q  for some high values of p . That would render any brinkmanship fruitless as it indeed 
becomes effective but not acceptable. From the proposition     i min i max q q  it follows that the 





















If the probability  p  for an offish CA satisfies the acceptability condition, then the following 
proposition must be valid: 
{ 1 }. max p P P p p p p R
      
          
Regarding   i min q ,  the  probability  i q  in  a  brinkmanship  strategy  has  to  remain  below  the 
critical  threshold   i max q .  Above  that  value  TD i  will  refrain  from  a  strategy  of  ‘not-to-
consolidate’ because it fears mutual detrimental effects. Therefore, for every given probability 
0 1 p    the probabilistic threat is credible when a country-specific 

i q  is an element of the 
finite set 

i Q . The according proposition is: 
{ }. i i i i i min i i max i q Q Q q q q q q R
      
            
When the endogenous effectiveness and acceptability conditions for the parameters  p  and  i q  
are satisfied, TD i will resort to brinkmanship. CA’s response to TDi’s brinkmanship is to 
immediately transfer ‘fiscal adjustment costs’ amounting to the share  i c . This is equivalent to 
TD i passing the respective portion of ‘fiscal adjustment costs’ on to current EMU members, 
i.e.  the  bail-out  in  the  face  of  such  negative  externalities.  At  this  stage,  then  TD i  will 
henceforth commit to fiscal consolidation since there are no further opportunities to pass costs 
on to current account surplus countries of the euro area. This is because beyond that point CA 
is no longer willing to pay for safe-guarding ‘EMU stability’. The remainder of the game-
theoretic  analysis  focuses  on  the  Nash  bargaining  solution  for  distributing  TD i ’s  ‘fiscal 
adjustment costs’ during a Greek-type crisis for EMU. This is to say that we ascertain each 
player’s portion of such fiscal costs. 
 




An NBS is characterized by complete information. It is finite in that only one offer and no 
counter-offers are possible when bargaining. The bargaining revolves around arguing over 
sharing the ‘fiscal adjustment costs’ of safe-guarding ‘EMU stability’. Given that all charac-
teristics  of  the  game  are  common  knowledge,  the  players  look  ahead  and  anticipate  the 
reciprocal best responses. Due to this backward induction, negotiation time is irrelevant and 
the bargaining game comes to an immediate solution. In line with this rationale, present see-
sawing – in terms of announcing and stipulating fiscal retrenchment on the Greek level and 
deliberating upon bail-outs at European end – is representing the preparatory stage before 
both camps finally put their cards on the table. 
 
The game  ( )   i c d  is completed by a Nash bargaining on the non-empty, convex and compact 
set comprising any convex combination of vector  1 2 ( )  c c  in
2 
 R . According to the NBS it has 
to be dealt with Pareto-efficient solutions only. The particular share  i c  of ‘fiscal adjustment 
costs’, which TD i can load on to CA, is the bargaining outcome. The NBS is derived from 
the Nash product (NP) weighted with the respective bargaining power: 
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 max ( ( )) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ( ))
     
i i
ij
i i i i i c
NP d u c u d u c u d
    
with    ij j ij i c d c  , 0  i  , 0   i  , and  1    i i   . 
Given the players’ utility functions the maximization problem in light of  ( 1 )    i d   is: 
1 2
max ( ) ( 1) ((1 ) )


     
i i
i i
i i i i c c
d c c
    . 
The according first-order condition is: 
( 1) ((1 ) )) ( 1) ((1 ) ) 0
i i i i
i i i i i i i i
i
dNP
c c c c
dc
       
 
          . 
After rearranging we receive the equilibrium solution: 
(1 )
(1 )
not defined  if  0
0 <     1   if 0 1






















Here, it becomes obvious that CA’s actual willingness to pay for bailing out TDi depends on 
the distribution of bargaining power. The less bargaining power  i   CA exhibits, the higher 
are the values for 

i c . Consequently, TD i can elicit more funds amounting to 

i c  from CA as 
their bargaining power  i   increases, hence, having other EMU members over the barrel. We  
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recall  that 

i c  is  the  share  of  ‘fiscal  adjustment  costs’ 
F
i C  that  is  acceptable  to  CA.  With 
respect to the complete brinkmanship game  ( )   i d   the NBS is, hence, 
NBS: ( ) ( (1 ) ) i i i d c c 
        . 
Considering the specific characteristics of the NBS, the combination of both players’ Nash 
strategies [‘not-to-consolidate’, ‘bail-out’] can also be represented in terms of their respective 
reaction functions ij R . Due to complete information TD i can anticipate CA’s optimal choice. 




not defined  if  0
( ) 0 <   1    if 0 1


























not defined      if  0
( ) 0 < (1- )  1  if 0 1






















The players’ reaction functions R ij constitute the unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium 
incorporating a specific NBS of the entire game  ( )   i d   and  ( )
F
i G C d   respectively for every 
fixed 
    p P p  and
    q Q q . This is to say that for effective and acceptable brinkmanship, 
CA’s  response  to  TD i ’s  credible  brinkmanship  strategy  is  to  burden  itself  with  ‘fiscal 
adjustment costs’ 
F
i C  amounting to the share of  i c . Thus, TD i passes the respective ‘fiscal 
adjustment costs’ on to other EMU members. When obtaining a share  i c  of ‘fiscal adjustment 
costs’, TDi will abstain from further attempts to promote a hazardous fiscal policy stance and 
will behave well. This is because, at that point, CA’s willingness to pay for contributing to the 
public good ‘EMU stability’ is exhausted. So, there is no more moral hazard related to fiscal 
policy. 
 
It is important to note that this outcome is primarily related, although not restricted to, to the 
parties  directly  involved  in  the  negotiation  process.
11  It  goes  without  saying  that  the 
exogenously invoked limited liability can be altered. However, increasing CAs’ willingness-
                                                 




to-pay would not change the general tone of the analysis on moral-hazard behavior. At least, 
this applies as long as it is assumed that EMU represents a joint public good. Henceforth, 
there must be some positive limited liability. However, in this respect, there might be another 
caveat in order: as the modeling framework reckons one TD’s brinkmanship vis-à-vis CA, the 
Greek-type crisis has been one particular round in the ‘boxing match’, though such a crisis 
scenario may occur again. Insofar, one may expect that newly incipient but random sovereign 
debt crisis within EMU to mark the starting point for another round of the outlined threat 
game. Hence, the institutional setup of EMU is the ground for brinkmanship, whereas ‘crisis’ 
acts as a catalyst within the overall process. 
 
 
4 Conclusions and policy implications 
 
The Greek crisis involved intense negotiations among the euro area members and depended to 
a large extent on political factors. In this paper, we have presented a framework that formally 
takes account of the interactions between the economic and political factors in such type of a 
crisis in the context of the EMU. We have based our analysis on a political-economic, game-
theoretic model that helps to understand why and how the parties involved in the Greek crisis 
arrived at the bail-out and on what conditions the final solution depended. In doing so, we 
have formally taken account of the negative externality problem that is central to all policy 
debates related to the EMU’s institutional design and played an important role in the Greek 
crisis. However, contrary to the existing literature, we have not only focused on the economic 
aspect of such negative externality, but also looked at how it emanates and interact with the 
political  factors, in particular the dynamics of the political  negotiation process within the 
EMU. Based on our analysis, we have demonstrated that the bail-out was inevitable (i.e. a 
threat of default by one member must (under identifiable conditions) result in sharing the 
costs of fiscal adjustment by the rest of the members) but that it does not have to be associated 
with a future moral hazard problem. 
 
As regards the policy implications, it is important to stress that the results are conditional on 
the present political-economic set-up of the EMU. In other words, the EMU problems do not 
only ensue from the Greek fiscal problems alone, but from the interactions of these problems 
with the actual political-economic configuration of the EMU. The sheer fact that countries 
share the same currency does not necessarily have to lead to negative spillovers  between  
 
18 
them. If this was the case, the fiscal problems in Ecuador, a dollarized country, would give 
rise to a threat to the dollar – evidently this is not the case (see more Balcerowicz (2010)). In 
the EMU, however, refinancing difficulties of a small country like Greece which accounts for 
only 2% of the euro area’s GDP can trigger a systemic crisis for the whole EMU. This is 
different from the case of the US monetary union where fiscal woes of even such big states as 
California do not wreak such havoc. 
 
The weakness of the current EMU set-up is that it neither provides sufficient incentives for 
curtailing excessive lending and indebtedness (see more De Haan et al. (2004)), nor secures 
the  degree    of  political  integration  necessary  to  attain  a  sufficient  degree  of  policy 
coordination.  Strengthening  fiscal  discipline  is  of  key  importance,  but  it  has  consistently 
collided with the enforceability problem of applying supra-national fiscal rules to sovereign 
states. While stepping-up the degree of political integration could alleviate this tension, policy 
makers in Europe are well aware of how lengthy this process would be and how naïve it is to 
believe that political integration could be significantly accelerated. 
 
Squeezed  between  the  undesirable  now  and  the  long-to-attain  future,  the  EMU  needs  to 
develop some intermediate solutions that would help to bridge this gap. Our analysis suggests 
at least a few possible avenues (see also Fahrholz and Wójcik (2010)). 
 
First,  should  a  bail-out  be  unavoidable,  given  the  current  state  of  the  political-economic 
configuration of the EMU – as our analysis seems to suggest – then it is better to make it rule-
based and explicit. This may at least limit the haggling and uncertainty in the course of such 
events resulting in a lower risk premium associated with such uncertainty (see Bini Smaghi 
(2010) who makes a similar case in context of financial markets). This would also render 
support for the European Monetary Fund suggested earlier by Gros and Mayer (2010). 
 
Second – and this is our main conclusion – the analysis suggests that, in order to improve the 
EMU’s functioning, more weight should be given to solutions which address the negative 
externality  problem.  This  could  be  achieved  by  changing  the  political  incentives  in  the 
negotiation processes of the EMU. In a sense, this would address the political aspect of the 
political-economic set-up of the EMU and hence would complement the necessary (but so far 
largely failed) efforts to improve the EU and domestic fiscal frameworks per se. One such  
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solution  could  be  to  establish  ‘exit  rules’.  Specifying  conditions  for  leaving  the  EMU, 
including the costs and legal requirements of such an operation, would bring at least three 
benefits: i) on the constituency level, it would make exit costs explicit to electorates, thus 
diminishing incentives to follow such strategies; ii) on the government level, it would weaken 
the bargaining position of troubled countries vis-à-vis the rest of EMU, thus decreasing the 
effectiveness of brinkmanship strategies; iii) on the markets level, it would reduce uncertainty 
and stabilize market reaction in case of a future potential default or exit, thus decreasing the 
scope for negative externality. 
 
Overall, making exit costs and procedures explicit would increase the perceived costs of an 
exit relative to the short-term political costs of economic adjustment. This would serve as a 
deterrent to brinkmanship, stimulate fiscal discipline and decrease the scope for the negative 
externality. While additional research is needed to shed more light on the effects of such exit 
rules, it seems that the existence of the rules would strengthen the EMU’s sustainability in the 
long-run, both in economic and political terms. Paradoxically, it may make future exits less – 
not more – probable, as shown by the history of certain national states struggling to preserve 
their  internal  integration  (cf.  The  Economist  2005).  Their  experience  suggests  that  when 
secession is not permitted, a pressure for it rises. When secession is openly allowed, many 
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